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Cross-nationalizing the History of Industrial Hazard
CHRISTOPHER C SELLERS*
Over the summer months of 2007, Mattel Inc., the world’s largest toy-maker, recalled
some twenty million toys, nearly three million of them because of lead-contaminated paint.
Therecallmushroomedintoaninternationalevent. InGermany, regulatorspulledsomeone
million toys from the shelves, in Britain and Ireland, two million; countries from Malaysia
and Bahrain joined the toy returns. In just one of the incriminated Chinese factories, some
eighty-three different kinds of toys may have been painted with lead pigment: Thomas the
Tankengine, DoratheExplorer, SesameStreetcharactersofCookieMonster, ElmoandBig
Bird, as well as “Sarge” and other ﬁgures based on the Disney movie Cars. Suddenly, this
toxic metal, along with carbon monoxide the world’s oldest recognized industrial hazard,
tookthewesternworldbysurprise. Despitewidespreadassumptionsthatweweresafefrom
its clutches, a whole new vein of lead had turned up, running into our department stores,
homes, and perhaps also our children.1
The episode graphically exposed how we in western nations now frame the hazards our
industries may impose upon us. US media coverage was split between blaming and exon-
erating Mattel’s executives but, more uniformly, construed this as a crisis for American
consumers. The furore revolved almost entirely around the malfeasance of our own cor-
porations and regulatory agencies, or around the evil and neglectful Chinese. Coverage did
extend to the industrial pollution produced by China’s quarter century of economic boom,
buttheinsidesofitsfactorieswereanothermatter. AreportbyaUS-basedgroup, theChina
Labor Watch, about the “brutal conditions” in Chinese toy factories, was released at what
might seem the perfect time, a week after the lead recall story broke. But the momentary
upsurge in coverage then faded, as reporters stuck to Mattel’s, and their nations’, efforts to
monitor what Chinese factories made.2
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Mediaprioritieswererevealingofhowweinthedevelopednations, perhapsespeciallyin
America,nowhavequiteadifferentattitudetowardsindustrialhazardsthanwedidacentury
ago. At that time, what public discussions there were of lead poisoning mainly concerned
its effects on workers. But in this ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the United States
has become so dependent on developing nations for manufacturing that the vast majority of
goods we buy have been made elsewhere. A full 65per cent of Mattel’s products are made
in China; as are up to 80per cent of all toys sold in the US. This degree of dependence
has evolved in the wake of new regulatory regimes in America and Europe, based on ever
more precautionary principles. But while the United States has effectively restricted or
abolished the most dangerous usages of many industrial materials and processes within its
own borders, not all other nations have followed suit.3 Capitalism has thereby been busy,
makinguswesternersevermorecluelessabouttheindustrialhazardsthatourownandother
corporations foist upon the rest of the world, in supplying the products for our way of life.
A century and a half ago, when Karl Marx coined the notion of commodity fetishism,
he was referring to a phenomenon that occurred inside a given nation. For many of us
today, the spell of the commodity, shiny and colourful in its appearance on store shelves,
continues to obscure the social relations of the workplace, as Marx would have it, including
the labouring hands that actually made it.4 How much more powerful the spell of the
commodity has become in our own time and place, when most manufacturing happens in
a foreign land, when Americans’ and Europeans’ encounters with the factory and its work
are becoming so few and far between. We have heard much about how globalization has
collapsed distance, linking people from different nations via, among other ways, global
supply chains. Here is one area where you do not need to be a Marxist to see that linkage
enables attitudes not so much of connection as of indifference. Undertaking the task of
making commodities for us, these distant places shoulder a scale and variety of hazards that
our own “progress” has made ever more difﬁcult for us to imagine.
For all the work they have done over the past twenty years in uncovering the history
of these hazards, historians of health and other areas have thus far provided relatively few
insights into this contemporary dilemma. We have learned about the history of industrial
hazardsinawideningarrayofnations,yetanobstaclepersists.Almostallourstudiestendto
take the enshrinement of health and/or environmental protection in a single locale or nation
astheendofthestory. Inadvertently, wetherebyprojectauniversalityontowhatare, asthis
crisis of leaded toys reminds us, our own nation-bound experiences. This paper explores
waysinwhichwemaygivegreaterheedtothosecross-nationalandmutualtransformations
thathavebroughtustothisjuncture.Iargueforamoredeliberateinclusionofmultiplescales
in our historical projects, from the local and national to the international or global. Such
3 ‘Mattel CEO defends toy manufacturing
operations in China’, Cox Newspapers Washington
Bureau (13 Sept. 2007) accessed 30 May 2008 at
http://www.coxwashington.com/hp/content/
reporters/stories/2007/09/1; Nancy Langston, ‘The
retreat from precaution: regulating diethylstilbestrol
(DES), endocrine disruptors, and environmental
health’, Environ. Hist., 2008, 13 (1): 41–65; David
Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, ‘Industry challenges to
the principles of prevention in public health: the
precautionary principle in historical perspective’,
Public Health Reports, 2002, 117: 501–12; Sonja
Boehmer-Christiansen, ‘The precautionary
principle in Germany—enabling government’, in
Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds),
Interpreting the precautionary principle, London,
Earthscan, 1994.
4 Karl Marx, Capital, ed. Frederick Engels, 3 vols,
New York, International Publishers, 1967 (lst German
ed., 1867), vol. 1, pp. 71–83.
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conscious alternation creates a greater awareness of those transnational connections—as
well as disconnections—that prevailed at a given time and place.
Once we start to reﬂect more self-consciously on these differences of scale, to analyse
their historical speciﬁcity and interdependence, further methodological dilemmas present
themselves. Tools that have been around for a while—the traditions of comparative case
studies, world-systems theory, global history, and the history of international institutions—
need better reconciling with the largely more localized insights of the last decades of social
andculturalhistory. Amongthecontrasts, thesetraditionsofsweepingandmacro-historical
views have often leaned more on material objects and dynamics, whether of infection or
economics, while the social and cultural history of the last twenty years of scholarship has
concentrated more on those many groups, perceptions, and conﬂicts shaping the history of
health and environment in a single place.
I suggest we may better reconcile what have heretofore seemed diametrically opposed
terms of historical analysis by considering a toxin’s variable and evolving materiality. The
“stuff” or nature of lead is, after all, what links today’s Chinese lead workers with the toxic
toys discovered on our store shelves. This example also suggests how biases of perception,
rooted in our own geographic and disciplinary standpoints, have subtly steered our scholar-
ship away from differences. Now, as in the past, a real but not fully recognized danger may
belurkingindistantplaces. Conﬁningourselvestosocialorculturalanalysisaloneimpedes
our ability to address some key dimensions of difference, and their moral implications. We
need to embrace, more or less forthrightly, what today’s scientists now know about the
impact of lead on human bodies and environments.
By consciously juxtaposing lead’s contemporary and historical manifestations, we open
the door to a more robust interdisciplinary holism, a fuller integration of natural scientiﬁc
and medical insights with those from the social sciences and humanities. We also gain new
analytical leverage for comparing and interpreting the great variety of views of a toxin
such as lead across time and place. We can, by way of illustration, situate international
perspectives, from those of today to that of the early International Labour Organization
(ILO), alongside national regulatory projects of countries as different as the United States
and China or Mexico, and local perspectives afforded, for instance, by looking at the
history of a single lead smelter in El Paso, on the US–Mexico border. The historical study
of transnational interactions thereby becomes more manageable. We can begin to address
why and how a single industrial hazard has acquired such different manifestations and
meanings in Mexico and China as opposed to the United States.
The Multi-scalar and the Material:
Historiographic Trends and Precedents
Nowhere have the contrasts between global or transnational and national or local
approaches been more marked than in the historiography of industrial hazards itself. When
Henry Sigerist and Ludwig Teleky wrote about workplace hazards in the middle of the
twentieth century, their analyses leaped with relative ease from one nation’s experience to
another’s. Their inclusion of so many different nations’ experiences side by side hinged on
largely unscrutinized assumptions about the cross-national uniformity of industrialization,
its hazards, and their prevention. Ignoring hazards outside the workplace, they homed in
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on two speciﬁc aspects of the hazards within it: detection and regulation. Both authors
conceptualized this “progress” mainly as the passage of the right laws, creating rules and
agencies that empowered experts, who accomplished what was needed.5 The revival of the
historiographyofindustrialhazardsfromthe1980sgreatlycomplicatedthisearlierintellec-
tual legacy of nation-hopping. The methodology of social history revealed the wide range
of other groups that have had an inﬂuential role in determining the approach to occupa-
tional hazards at a given place and time. Apart from doctors and hygienic experts, we have
learned that the willingness of managers or owners, technological change, and especially
the insistence or protest of workers, whether unionized or not, may all have an impact on
the dangers afﬂicting a particular workplace. Within any nation or industry, questions of
recognition and regulation are so fraught with struggles between groups that “progress”
itself looks more contingent than straightforward, a matter of contention.6
Environmental history has complicated matters still further by broaching those many
otherhazardsandconﬂictsthatindustrialproductionmaycause. Factoriesmaycontaminate
nearby neighbourhoods or, via air or rivers, more distant regions. Still further aﬁeld, their
toxins may turn up in consumer goods, from paint to apples.7 More or less tacitly, these
insights, in parallel with those in the social history of occupational hazards, have become
possible through what, in comparison with the studies of Sigerist or Teleky, looks like
a certain conﬁnement of geographic scope. It is by the careful unpacking of national and,
belowthat,oflocalcircumstancesthatwehavelearnedaboutthemyriadgroupsandcomplex
politics leading to the recognition of black lung, or the impact of a factory or reﬁnery on
neighbouring communities.8 Such insights, if we are to absorb them, have made it difﬁcult
5 Henry E Sigerist, ‘Historical background of
industrial and occupational diseases’, Bull. N. Y. Acad.
Med., 1936, 12 (11): 597–609; Ludwig Teleky,
History of factory and mine hygiene, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1948; George Rosen, The
history of miners’ diseases, a medical and social
interpretation, New York, Schuman’s, 1943.
6 Social history work in English began with two
collections of the mid-1980s, Paul Weindling (ed.),
The social history of occupational health, London and
Dover, NH, Croom Helm, 1985; David Rosner and
Gerald Markowitz (eds), Dying for work: essays on
the history of workers’ safety and health in twentieth
century America, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1987. More recent studies include Arthur
McIvor and Ronald Johnston, ‘Medical knowledge
and the worker: occupational lung diseases in the
United Kingdom, c.1920–1975’, Labor: Studies in
Working Class History of the Americas, 2005, 2 (4):
63–86; Mark W Bufton and Joseph Melling, “‘A mere
matter of rock”: organized labour, scientiﬁc evidence
and British government schemes for compensation of
silicosis and pneumoniosis among coal miners,
1926–1940’, Med. Hist., 2005, 49 (2): 155–78;
Angela Vergara, ‘The recognition of silicosis: labor
unions and physicians in the Chilean copper industry,
1930s–1960s’, Bull. Hist. Med., 2005, 79 (4): 723–48.
7 The literature has become voluminous but recent
work is well-illustrated in a recent special issue of the
journal Environmental History: Jody A Roberts and
Nancy Langston, ‘Toxic bodies/toxic environments:
an interdisciplinary forum’, Environ. Hist.,
2008, 13 (4): 629–35, accessed 9 May 2009 at
http://www.historycooperative.org.libproxy.
cc.stonybrook.edu/journals/eh/13.4/roberts.html;
Stephen Mosley, ‘Common ground: integrating social
and environmental history’, J. Soc. Hist., 2006,
39 (3): 915–33; Joy Parr, ‘Smells like?: sources of
uncertainty in the history of the Great Lakes
environment’, Environ. Hist., 2006, 11 (2):
269–99; Linda Nash, ‘Purity and danger: historical
reﬂections on the regulation of environmental
pollutants’, Environ. Hist., 2008, 13 (4):
651–8.
8 Alan Derickson, Black lung: anatomy of a public
health disaster, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
1998; Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, Miners’
lung: a history of dust disease in British coal mining,
Aldershot and Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2007;
Andrew Hurley, Environmental inequalities: class,
race, and industrial pollution in Gary, Indiana,
1945–1980, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 1995; Barbara L Allen, Uneasy alchemy:
citizens and experts in Louisiana’s chemical corridor
disputes, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2003; Gerald
Markowitz and David Rosner, Deceit and denial: the
deadly politics of industrial pollution, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 2002.
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to return to those assumptions that enabled an earlier cross-nationalism in industrial hazard
history.
A further complication has been the cultural turn of scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s
history of science as well as medicine. At stake in the science or medicine of a speciﬁc time
and place are not just social conﬂicts but cultural constructions, an expert discourse that
mediates the realities of nature and the human body, and may itself dispense or exert power.
Scholars in science studies laid the groundwork by urging, then largely by assuming, an
agnosticism towards the natural objects named and debated by scientists, early on styled
as a sociological “principle of symmetry”. Across science studies (including the history of
science and medicine), much cutting-edge work of the 1980s and 1990s shunned invoca-
tions of the material, whether natural or economical, as Popperian positivism. Struggles to
carve out room and recognition for sociocultural insights fuelled the now-familiar debates
over the social construction of science, or “science wars”, of the 1990s. Whether more
or less inﬂuenced by construction, historians of science and of medicine often subscribed
to a rigorous historicism with similar implications: not to attend to material objects and
inﬂuences until the doctors and scientists of an era recognized them.9
Partly to get beyond the stark position-taking of these debates, scholarship in science
studies as well as in medical and science history has more recently gravitated towards ques-
tions of ontology, that branch of philosophy that deals with the experience and perception
of objects in our world. Recognizing that more than just “ideas” are at risk in the histor-
ical trajectories of medical and other sciences, scholars of technoscience now prefer to
talk of “materiality”: of how bodies—human or otherwise—have manifested themselves,
or “mattered”, in different ways in different places and times. Projects such as Lorraine
Daston’s edited volume on biographies of scientiﬁc objects and Ian Hacking’s Historical
ontology seek to reconcile the dynamic historicity of scientiﬁc objects with their solidity
and durability for historical actors in a given time and place. This is a powerful insight, of
great value to the historian of industrial hazard. Yet such an historian would hobble him-
or herself considerably by sticking, as Daston and Hacking do, to “objects or their effects
which do not exist in any recognizable form until they are objects of scientiﬁc study”.10 A
troubling but enduring constant of industrial hazard history is that the hazards themselves,
along with their victims, have often existed long before they were made the objects of
formal scientiﬁc study. To make the most of an historical ontology approach, historians
9 For two discussions of the various symmetry
principles invoked in science studies, see Daniel
Breslau, ‘Sociology after humanism: a lesson from
contemporary science studies’, Sociological Theory,
2000, 18 (2): 289–307; Alex Preda, ‘The turn to
things: arguments for a sociological theory of things’,
Sociological Quarterly, 1999, 40 (2): 347–66.
10 The phrase “matters” comes from Judith Butler,
Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of ‘sex’,
New York and London, Routledge, 1993. I mean to
invoke here an additional body of literature on
historical ontology, coined by Ian Hacking, Historical
ontology, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,
2002 (“recognizable form”, p. 11), which stresses a
“materiality” deﬁned through a variety of
historic-cultural lenses and practices; Lorraine Daston
(ed.), Biographies of scientiﬁc objects, University of
Chicago Press, 2000; Don Ihde and Evan Selinger
(eds), Chasing technoscience: matrix for materiality,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003;
Christophe Lecuyer and David Brock, ‘The
materiality of microelectronics’, History and
Technology, 2006, 22 (3): 301–25; Alison Ravencroft,
‘Coming to matter: the grounds of our embodied
difference’, Postcolonial Studies, 2007, 10 (3):
287–300; also Christopher Sellers, ‘The artiﬁcial
nature of ﬂuoridated water: between nations,
knowledge, and material ﬂows’, Osiris, 2nd series,
Landscapes of exposure: knowledge and illness in
modern environments, ed. Gregg Mitman, Michelle
Murphy and Christopher Sellers, 2004, 19:
182–200.
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of industrial hazard would best seek ways of integrating its insights with the health and
ecological, as well as economic, dynamics of the times, facets of history which today’s
sciences themselves may illuminate.
Easingtheprospectsforintegration, overthelasttwentyyearsveinsofinquirymoreopen
to the “positivist” sciences have forged new understandings of the history of cross-national
economic interchanges, and also, more socio-cultural approaches. Business historians like
Alfred Chandler have charted the expansion of a single institution, the large corporation,
across national boundaries. Others have looked more generally at the rise and spread of
modernindustriesaswellastechnologies, and, inthecaseoftheeconomichistorianJeffrey
Williamson, at changing patterns of a globalization deﬁned with refreshing rigour as a
measurable degree of market integration between nations. A different tradition draws upon
the world systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, as in the recent work of the histor-
ical sociologist Beverly Silver, who charts, correlates and seeks to explain the changing
global distribution of particular industries over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and
the movements and resistance they have stirred. Other sociologists as well as geographers
have offered searching attention to the cross-national interchanges involved in globalizing
transformations, from commodity and migration networks to cultural shifts in literature
and art. Most inﬂuentially, the neo-Marxist David Harvey has offered provocative read-
ings of the spatial dynamics through which political/economic and cultural change may
connect.11
Especially useful for historians tackling the changing geography of industrial haz-
ards is Harvey’s notion of the “spatial ﬁx”. It offers a general term for what journalists
like William Greider in the 1990s often summed up as a “race to the bottom”: once
technologies of production become portable, producers seek out the cheapest and least
protected or resistant labour and locales. This “race” itself deserves a great deal more
study for how it may, as Greider suggests, have spurred a transfer of manufacturing
and mining hazards to the developing world. Labour historians such as Jefferson Cowie
in Capital moves offered an early compelling model of how study of this “race” may
combine a transnational scope with the social historian’s localist approach, by following
the successive factory openings of a single company (RCA) from Newark and Indiana
across the US border into Ciudad Juárez, Mexico.12 Unfortunately, labour historians of
11 Alfred D Chandler Jr, Scale and scope: the
dynamics of industrial capitalism, Cambridge, MA,
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994;
Kevin H O’Rourke and Jeffrey G Williamson,
Globalization and history: the evolution of a
nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press, 2001; Michael D Bordo, Alan M
Taylor and Jeffrey G Williamson (eds), Globalization
in historical perspective, University of Chicago Press,
2005; Immanuel Wallerstein, World-systems analysis:
an introduction, Durham, Duke University Press,
2004; Beverly J Silver, Forces of labor: workers’
movements and globalization since 1870, Cambridge
University Press, 2002; Andrew Herod, Labor
geographies: workers and the landscapes of
capitalism, New York, Guilford Press, 2001;
David Harvey, The condition of postmodernity: an
enquiry into the origins of cultural change, reprint,
Oxford and Cambridge, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 1990;
idem, Justice, nature and the geography of difference,
Malden, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997; idem, A brief history
of neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, 2005.
12 David Harvey, ‘The spatial ﬁx: Hegel, Von
Thunen, and Marx’, Antipode, 1981, 13 (3):
1–12, accessed 9 May 2009 at DOI:10.1111/
j.1467-8330.1981.tb00312.x; William Greider, One
world, ready or not: the manic logic of global
capitalism, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997;
Jefferson R Cowie, Capital moves: RCA’s
seventy-year quest for cheap labor, Ithaca, NY,
Cornell University Press, 1999); Silver, op. cit.,
note 11 above.
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this “race to the bottom” from Silver to Cowie have little to say about any resulting
hazards.
On this front, environmental history, long invested in an ecological materialism and
recently inclined towards both cross-national and sociocultural methods, has offered fur-
therprecedentsandtoolswithwhichtowork. Sinceitsconsolidationoverthe1980sstarting
especially in the United States, this ﬁeld has appealed, more or less, to “ecology”, based on
ﬁndings and methods of contemporary sciences, as a basis for writing “the role and place of
nature in human history”.13 Most environmental historians continue to adopt national and
especially local sites for their projects, but over the 1990s, new scalar alternatives emerged.
Some, such as Richard Grove, tackled the environmental history of colonial empires, while
others, such as John McNeill, pursued a global environmental history, in his case, of
twentieth-century transformations, industrial and otherwise. More in tune with the social
historian’scustomaryscale,afewenvironmentalhistorianshavealsonowcomposedstudies
that, without being either global or comparative in conception, are thoroughly transnational
analyses of the interchange between select nations. Ian Tyrells’ True gardens of the gods,
by concentrating on the biotic interchange between two speciﬁc places, California and
Australia, captures a contingency, and a social as well as an ecological complexity much
closer to that of social history. Through a focus on single commodities, scholars such as
John Soluri (bananas) and Jennifer Anderson (mahogany) have honed ways of studying
those cross-national ﬂows of funds, corporations, and technology, as well as local trans-
formations that have connected the US with developing nations in Central America and the
Caribbean.14
As some environmental historians have absorbed insights from cultural history and the
history of science and medicine, ﬁnding common ground with the latter’s “materiality”
agenda, theyhaveengagedmoreandmorewithissuesofhumanandpublichealth. By2005,
RichardWhitewasdeclaringa“culturalturn”inenvironmentalhistory, areceptivenessthat
was closely tied to this ﬁeld’s growing appreciation of the importance, and historicity, of
human body–environment relations. Work, from that of Conevery Bolton Valenˇ cius to that
ofLindaNashandGreggMitman, hasseamlesslyblendedacloseattentiontothehistoryof
on-the-ground ecological change to a deep appreciation of how fundamentally a society’s
categories and understandings of health and environment can also be transformed. Drawing
and building upon recent transnational scholarship in medical history, especially by histor-
ians of colonial medicine such as Warwick Anderson and Mark Harrison, this convergent
eclecticismofmethodshasopenedmuchfruitfulterrain, anintellectualborderlandbetween
environmentalhistory, medicalhistory, andthehistoryofscience. Historiansofscienceand
of medicine have further facilitated this approach by integrating material methods with a
more familiar socio-cultural repertoire. For instance, recent studies of transnational ﬂows
13 Donald Worster, ‘Transformations of the earth:
toward an agroecological perspective in history’, J.
Am. Hist., 1990, 76: 1087–1106, p. 1089.
14 ‘Roundtable on environmental history’, J. Am.
Hist., 1990, 76:1087–147;JRM cNeill, Something
new under the sun: an environmental history
of the twentieth-century world, New York,
W W Norton, 2000; Ian Tyrrell, True gardens of
the gods: Californian–Australian environmental
reform, 1860–1930, University of California Press,
1999; John Soluri, Banana cultures: agriculture,
consumption, and environmental change in Honduras
and the United States, Austin, University of Texas
Press, 2005; Jennifer L Anderson, ‘Nature’s currency:
the Atlantic mahogany trade, 1720–1830’, PhD
dissertation, New York University, 2007.
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of knowledge from Londa Schiebinger to Harold Cook have emphasized their ties to the
movements of trade and commerce.15
Work and its hazards have provided much topical and thematic fodder for these conver-
gences. In the history of industrial hazard, further investigation is needed of the different
ways in which toxins and their effects have been viewed across times and places other than
our own; yet strict nominalism and historicism can take us only so far into these differ-
ences. In particular, they cannot tell us much about where and when people may remain
unaware, or only partly aware, of actual contemporaneous effects and pathology, or else
have apprehended these, but in ways radically different from our own. By the same token,
of course, a strictly ecological or epidemiological approach tells us little about such crucial
issues as the evolution of hazard awareness and understanding, the sensory and cognitive
experience of pollution, or the power struggles that could result. My point is this: any
approach that remains too exclusively culturalist or materialist will in the end marginalize
burning questions in the history of an industrial toxin such as lead.
Not so paradoxically, then, some privileging of today’s scientiﬁc consensus about the
nature of lead and its physiological effects may well be necessary in order more fully to
discern the variety of ways in which an industrial hazard has “mattered” across place and
time. Use of this knowledge helps us decipher which societies and groups have grappled
with lead, and where we might expect its effects to register with scientists and doctors.
Such extrapolations enable us better to study experiences beyond established scientiﬁc and
medical communities, among those who might or might not have known it as “lead”, or
treated it as toxic. In particular, such extrapolations may provide important platforms for
extending the historical study of industrial hazards to the developing world. As we seek to
place the experiences with lead in different nations alongside one another, across a divide
as deep and complex as that between developed and developing nations, it is especially
important to delineate differences not just in political economy or culture but in concrete
contacts with lead and its effects. As a starting point, rather than a symmetric agnosticism
towards scientiﬁc claims about exposure, I suggest we make a conscious effort to assess
historical exposures and their differences: a principle, instead, of environmental symmetry.
Situating actual exposures to lead as experienced and understood in today’s United States
or Great Britain, against those in other places and times, can offer vital groundwork for
understandingthattheeffectsofthistoxinmaybeapprehendedinwaysquitedifferentfrom
our own.
15 Richard White, ‘From wilderness to hybrid
landscapes: the cultural turn in environmental history’,
Historian, 2004, 66 (3): 557–64; Conevery Bolton
Valenˇ cius, The health of the country: how American
settlers understood themselves and their land,N e w
York, Basic Books, 2002; Linda Lorraine Nash,
Inescapable ecologies: a history of environment,
disease, and knowledge, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 2006; Gregg Mitman, Breathing
space: how allergies shape our lives and landscapes,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007; Roberts and
Langston, op. cit., note 7 above; Mark Harrison,
Climates and constitutions: health, race, environment
and British imperialism in India, 1600–1850, Oxford
University Press, 2002; Pati Biswamoy and
Mark Harrison (eds), Health, medicine and empire:
perspectives on colonial India, Hyderabad, Orient
Longman, 2006; Londa Schiebinger, Plants and
empire: colonial bioprospecting in the Atlantic world,
Harvard University Press, 2007; Londa Schiebinger
and Claudia Swan (eds), Colonial botany: science,
commerce, and politics in the early modern world,
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007;
Harold J Cook, Matters of exchange: commerce,
medicine, and science in the Dutch golden age,N e w
Haven, Yale University Press, 2008; Mitman, Murphy
and Sellers (eds), op. cit., note 10 above; Christopher
Sellers, ‘Thoreau’s body: towards an embodied
environmental history’, Environ. Hist., 1999, 4 (4):
486–514.
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Up and Down the Scales of Lead’s Present
A principle of environmental symmetry can aid in understanding our own supra-national
present, as well as the past. It opens a common ground between the socio-cultural history
of industrial hazards and those global approaches to hazard history forged by scientists
themselves, such as Clair Patterson and Jerome Nriagu in the case of lead. Human manipu-
lations of the metal over the last two or three hundred years have spurred a lengthy episode
of exposures that are much higher than those throughout humans’ longer ecological and
evolutionary history.16 Such a sweeping perspective ﬂattens out the cross-national diversity
that those toxic toys reveal at the heart of today’s environmental dilemmas, and thereby
offers only a limited analytic purchase on changing cross-national patterns not just of lead
exposurebutofitscontrol,andthepolitical,economicandculturaldifferencesthatmakethis
control possible. In making a comparison between nations of industrial as well as medico-
regulatory contentions with lead, medical historians would do well to use not only a global
perspective, but also but one that takes into account the effects in particular localities. By
alternating our range from the global to the national and all the way down to local factories
and their surroundings, we can better ﬂesh out those parallel, evolving fusions of culture
and nature that comprise lead’s twenty-ﬁrst century present, as well as its twentieth-century
past.
We may, for instance, assume an ecological or environmental symmetry to the lead now
unexpectedly headed our way on Chinese toys. It suggests that this lead paint has already
taken its toll elsewhere, not just on the muscles and brains of China’s children but of its
workers. Such hazards are part of the reason ILO and WHO ofﬁcials estimated a global
burden of some 1.1 million deaths from work-related disease and injury alone in 1999,
roughly the same as from malaria. They project these numbers will rise over the ﬁrst half
of the twenty-ﬁrst century.17 A chief reason cited for this projection is a continued “race to
the bottom”. Corporations, so the story goes, have been hunting not just for the cheapest
labour, but for hazard havens, where dangerous materials and processes are tolerated.18
One advantage of following this process, using lead as a kind of tracer, is that it allows
us to consider impacts that have gone largely unnoticed. When we move towards a fuller
ﬂeshing out of the ﬁnger of lead of our own time, we ﬁnd it points not just to China but
back at us, the better off of the developed world. We have forged our own, quite different
relationships with lead: we use it still, even as our bodies register less of its presence
around us.
Forinstance,America’spublichealthtriumphoverleadisoftenillustratedthroughgraphs
that show declining blood lead levels over the late twentieth century, especially after lead
was banned in gasoline.19 But if we step upward in scale, to look at world lead production
16 Jerome O Nriagu, ‘Global metal pollution’,
Environment, 1990, 32 (7): 6–11; Jerome O Nriagu,
‘Tales told in lead’, Science, 1998, 281 (5383),
n.s.: 1622–3; McNeill, op. cit., note 14 above.
17 ‘The burden of occupational illness’, Press
Release WHO/31 (8 June 1999) accessed 6 March
2008 at www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/3n/pr99-31.html
18 For instance, Anita Chan and Robert J S Ross,
‘Racing to the bottom: international trade without a
social clause’, Third World Quarterly, 2003,
24 (6): 1011–28; Jackie Simpkins, ‘The
global workplace: challenging the race to the
bottom’, Development in Practice, 2004, 14 (1/2):
110–18; Greider, op. cit., note 12
above.
19 For one of these charts, see the following,
accessed 5 February, 2010:
http://www.epa.gov/bns/lead/Fig_01.giv
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Figure 1: Lead production trends worldwide.
(Data source: B R Mitchell, International historical statistics, 3 vols, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007.)
(Figure 1), a quite different picture emerges. Over the twentieth century, even after the
recognition and regulation of the 1970s and 1980s, the amount of lead produced had, at
best, only levelled off. That recent episode of lead-contaminated toys makes it easy to
predict what might be happening if this is broken down by nation: Mexico’s production
has risen somewhat, but China’s has sky-rocketed, especially over the last quarter century.
Whatissurprising, though, isthatleadproductionhasalsonotdeclinedinmanyofthemost
developed western nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom (Figure 2).
Muchofitcomesthroughsecondaryproduction, thatis, throughtherecyclingofleadscrap,
but the trend has still been level or upward.
Why?Toexplain,weﬁrstneedtodrawsomedistinctionsbetweentherealmsandvarieties
of lead exposures involved. The chart of falling lead levels shows only the lead that was
registered in the blood streams of those living in the United States. Its fall reﬂects, more
than anything else, a ban on tetra-ethyl lead petrol, that most efﬁcient means of making
the lead Americans bought and consumed bio-available. Recognizing that the relatively
tiny amounts of lead spewed into the atmosphere as car exhaust yielded such high bodily
burdens, the US moved quickly from the 1970s onwards to ban this, as well as other
consumer uses that made this toxin such a physiological, as well as an ecological, danger.
But while such measures, along with workplace reductions, brought down blood levels of
lead in the United States, they did little to prevent American usages of this toxin that did not
make it bio-available, either in workplaces or in consumer products. And they did still less
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Figure 2: Lead production trends by nation.
(Data source: B R Mitchell, International historical statistics, 3 vols, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007.)
to protect those beyond America’s shores, either in the consumer markets of the developing
world, or in its mines, smelters and production lines, where the commodities purchased by
Americans were increasingly made.
Asaresult, consumersintheUnitedStatesandothernationsofthedevelopedworldhave
surrounded themselves with what may be a growing amount of lead. But it is “safe” lead, in
productswhereitistightlyenclosed. Between1973and1993, dissipativeusesoflead, from
petrol additives to ammunition to paint and similar products, shrank from 20 to 5per cent
of Americans’ lead consumption. Meanwhile, electric soldering and especially batteries
(accumulators) also contain lead, and the proportion of the lead in batteries consumed in
the US leaped from 50 to 85per cent over this same period. The cathode ray tubes in our
television sets and computer screens, which contain as much as two kilograms of lead each,
have added to the growth in lead usage. At the same time, all this lead is far from being
safe for many outside the US, whether they are working or living where it is smelted and
processed,orexposedtothetoxinasaresultofablossominginternationaltradeinelectronic
waste.20
Americans’publichealthvictoryoverleadreﬂectedinthosechartsofdecliningbloodlead
levels has not come without costs. Even as Americans’ and other westerners’ lives depend
on lead as much as ever, its presence in our environment has been carefully constructed,
materially as well as socially, so that we do not give it another thought. Those contaminated
toys from China may have surprised us, but we had already unconsciously become remote
20 Marilyn B Biviano, Lorie A Wagner and Daniel
E Sullivan, Total materials consumption: an
estimation methodology and example using lead, a
materials ﬂow analysis, US Geological Survey
Circular No. 1183, Washington, DC, US Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1999.
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consumersoftheproduceofChineseandotherdeveloping-worldminesandsmelters.Yetwe
too easily lose sight of our dependence on, and complicity with, the continuing imposition
of these hazards on victims elsewhere.
How might we frame and research historical projects in ways that enable more scru-
tiny of, perhaps even foreground, these relations and dependencies? A ﬁrst step, as in
many other new arenas of historical inquiry, is to sketch a preliminary periodization. His-
torians exploring new models for industrial hazard history have begun to distinguish two
broad interconnecting phases over the twentieth century. It is only recently, from the 1960s
onwards, that this new, more broadly environmental science and regulation, which removes
bio-available lead from consumer products like petrol and paint, took hold in the United
States. A preceding phase, roughly covering the ﬁrst half of the century, was dominated
by modes of knowing and regulating that, at least in the United States and other developed
nations, concentratedfarmoreonworkplaceexposures. Thecirculationoflead, itshazards,
and their remedies were similarly cross-national in each of these eras. Hence, our explor-
ation of the research possibilities will in each case involve a global overview, as well as a
local study, of a single lead smelter poised between Mexico and the United States.
Multiple Scales in a Past Time:
The Early Twentieth-Century “Global”
Oneproblemwithdividinghistoryintoperiodsneedsearlyacknowledgement:thefurther
back we go, the more we encounter difﬁculties with evidence. Although comparable histor-
ical statistics are now available for many nations’ extractive and manufacturing industries,
even such recent statistics as those available for the early twentieth century are fragmentary
and difﬁcult to compare. Nevertheless, transnational vantage points are available for track-
ing the lead industries in various nations, namely, the statistics compiled by the League
of Nations. In its tracking of national efforts to recognize and regulate lead’s dangers, a
group like the International Labour Organization, founded in 1919 alongside the League
of Nations, helps to illuminate these cross-national patterns in the regulation of industrial
hazards. Suchinternationalinstitutionsandtheirglobalperspectivesdeservemoreattention
from industrial hazard historians. In order to understand better the “global imagination as
well as inﬂuence” of a group such as the ILO, to ﬂesh out just what its perspective did and
did not encompass, we need to scrutinize its constitution, meaning, and consequences not
just within its Geneva headquarters, but also outside; i.e. the impact it had at various levels
and locales around the world.
The ILO coalesced only after the production and consumption of lead by its chief sup-
porting nations had undergone many decades of transformation, accompanied by rising
scrutiny by health experts and the state. In the mostly European and developed nations out
of which the ILO arose, private lead and other companies had turned to increasingly larger
scale production, and new forms of labour organization—national unions—had long since
arisen. In its structure, the International Labour Organization reﬂected an historically and
geographically speciﬁc vision of modern society. Democratic governance was assumed. A
tripartite representation included national delegates from trade unions, employers and cent-
ral governments. In stark contrast to later attitudes, the industrial workplace was imagined
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to be the central stage where “social justice” was contested and dispensed.21 While a more
recent understanding of lead has riveted on extra-workplace, environmental contamination,
talk about lead in the early days of the ILO reﬂected just how thoroughly this organization
conﬁned its purview to worker hazards and the site of production itself.
The ILO deserves a great deal more attention from industrial hazard historians, starting
with its work in passing “conventions” that it recommended be made law by all its member
nations, thus instituting worldwide regulation. Initially, many of the recommendations
addressed particular industrial dangers, faced especially by nations in the developed world.
For instance, one of the ILO’s ﬁrst conventions, mentioned only in passing by many recent
historians, was a 1921 ban on white lead pigments in interior paint. While today we might
see here only a concern about consumer usage and the exposure of children, the documents
indicate that the chief worries of ILO delegates were about adult painters, who were more
likely to be poisoned by lead pigments when working indoors. Also characteristic was
their reliance on a classic clinical presentation of lead poisoning, as one of the ﬁrst three
“occupational diseases” for which they recommended workers’ compensation. We know
relatively little, as yet, about how the ILO came to these and other recommendations, or
aboutits“correspondencecommittee”ofexpertsinindustrialhealthandsafety,whichculled
information from member states for ILO statements of existing knowledge and practice.
Clearly, however, knowledge dissemination on this “most important subdivision of social
medicine”, in the view of its occupational health director Luigi Carozzi, was high on its
agenda. Much of Carrozzi’s early efforts concerned the production of an encyclopaedia,
published in 1930, that was made available in English, French, and Spanish, and widely
distributed.22
A strict historicism, conforming only to the lead hazards that the ILO and its experts
saw at the time, yields many interesting questions, for which the organization’s archives in
Geneva, voluminous and nearly untapped, promises abundant answers. But we gain addi-
tional analytical leverage by recognizing important limitations in how this international
agency conceived of an early twentieth-century ﬂow of lead into human societies, environ-
ments, andbodies. Whatstandsout, comparedwithtoday’sconcernsaboutlead, isjusthow
littleconsiderationtheILOdevotedtocontactswithleadoutsidetheworkplace. Everything
else was considered “public health”, an enterprise at this time largely centring on germs.
The encyclopaedia, for instance, included an essay on ‘Homework’, and another on ‘Food
21 William Martin, ‘The International Labour
Organization’, Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science in the City of New York, July 1926,
12 (1): 399–410; Markku Ruotsila, ‘“The Great
Charter for the Liberty of the Workingman”: labour,
liberals and the creation of the ILO’, Labour History
Review, 2002, 67 (1): 29–47; Jasmine Van Daele,
“‘Engineering social peace”: networks, ideas, and the
founding of the International Labour Organization’,
Intern. Rev. Soc. Hist., 2005, 50 (3):
435–66.
22 John Heitmann, ‘The ILO and the regulation of
white lead in Britain during the interwar years: an
examination of international and national campaigns
in occupational health’, Labour Hist. Rev., 2004,
69 (3): 267–84; Marcel Robert and Luigi
Parmeggiani, Fifty years of international
collaboration in occupational safety and health: ILO,
1919–1969, CIS information sheet 19, Geneva,
International Occupational Safety and Health
Information Centre, 1969; Luigi Carozzi, ‘The
International Labour Organization and the health of
the worker’, typescript, Geneva, Switzerland, 23 Feb.
1935, 6, Folder: Propaganda pamphlet (unpublished);
Hygiene, Industrial (1920–1953), International
Labour Organization Archives, Geneva, Switzerland;
International Labour Ofﬁce, Occupation and health:
encyclopedia of hygiene, pathology, and social
welfare, 2 vols, Geneva, International Labour Ofﬁce,
1930–1934.
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oftheindustrialworker’,butnoneonhousingorwatersupply.Bythesametoken,itsdiscus-
sion of “industrial wastes” was devoted largely to the impact of “organic matter”. It made
mention of “compounds of arsenic, lead or phenol derivatives”, but only to say that “waste
water” should “not contain” them.23 Such discrepancies in past versus present sciences of
lead’s hazards raise additional questions: for instance, whether and to what extent was lead
recognized in this period as an industrial water pollutant?
On this and other questions, further clarity about the ILO’s version of the “global” comes
when we shift our sights down the scale to what was happening in particular nations. The
ILOhadlimitedinﬂuenceonindustrialhygieneintheUnitedStates, theworld’slargestlead
producer—theChinaoftheearlytwentiethcentury. TheUSwasalsoanationwhoseunions
were arguably weaker and less politically effective than those in many parts of Europe. By
comparison with that continent, American state-building in industrial health had developed
more slowly and hesitantly, and was far more decentralized. Signiﬁcantly, America’s lead
industries (like those of China a century later) grew less because of multinationals moving
in from abroad than through indigenous corporate growth.
Early American hygienists, like Alice Hamilton for example, brought to bear their own
perceptions of factory conditions worldwide in making workplace lead and its effects more
publicly visible within the United States. Drawing on the literature and experience of other
developed nations across the Atlantic, they challenged prevalent combinations of supervi-
sion and indifference in their own country: factory inspectors, American doctors, managers
and owners who believed American factories and workers to be immune from European
ills. By the 1920s the “good progress” of American hygienists, based on a strengthening
combination of factory and workers’ compensation laws, won them entry to the ILO’s
circle of international experts. But continental Europeans, in particular, predominated in
the authorship of the ILO’s ﬁrst encyclopaedia. Despite lobbying by Samuel Gompers of
the American Federation of Labor and others, the US refused to apply for ILO membership
until the 1930s.24 Moreover, American states adopted ILO conventions only ﬁtfully. Some
provided compensation for lead poisoning, others did not; none of them went so far as to
ban white lead in paint. An abundance of lead came coupled with what, by ILO standards,
wasarelativelyweakandporousregulatorysystem. SituatingtheILO’sinternationalmodel
against such national experiences emphasizes, among other things, how much the ILO’s
“global” knowledge and prescriptions may have been gauged to the national politics and
states, as well as the levels of lead exposure, that were more prevalent in Europe than in the
United States.25
23 Occupation and health, ‘Homework’, pp.
964–70; ‘Industrial waste water (treatment of)’,
pp. 41–9.
24 Christopher C Sellers, Hazards of the job: from
industrial disease to environmental health science,
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1997;
Valentine Jobst III, ‘The United States and
international labor conventions’, Am. J. Int. Law,
1938, 32 (1): 135–8; C J Ratzlaff, ‘The International
Labor Organization of the League of Nations: its
signiﬁcance to the United States’, Am. Econ. Rev.,
1932, 22 (3): 447–61.
25 Workmen’s compensation for occupational
diseases: partial revision of the Convention [...].
Report V. International Labour Conference,
eighteenth session, Geneva, 1934, Geneva,
International Labour Ofﬁce, 1933–1934; Factory
inspection: historical development and present
organisation in certain countries, Geneva,
International Labour Ofﬁce, 1923; Ludwig Teleky,
History of factory and mine hygiene, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1948; analysis implicitly
from Sellers, op. cit., note 24 above, esp.
pp. 153–72.
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Industrial hazards in the developing world remained marginal not just to the ILO’s vision
but also to that of American hygienists during this period. To chart this marginality, we
also need to reach down to individual ﬁrms and the local level. While some lead-using
ﬁrms and factories were subjected to American industrial hygienists’ scrutiny, others were
not. Particularly marginalized were those in the most rural and undeveloped, as well as the
least “American”, corners of the nation. Few lead smelters were less seen by the American
state and its professional companions than one built in 1887 just outside El Paso, Texas,
by Phelps Dodge. Taking advantage of lead mines in northern Mexico, it lay not a hundred
yards from the Mexican border, just across the river from the Mexican town of Cuidad
Juárez.26 Although Alice Hamilton visited smelters in Arizona and Missouri, she did not
travel as far as the most “remote” of American smelters. It seems likely that Phelps Dodge
workers in El Paso were like those found in the Missouri smelter Hamilton did visit: “full
of malaria, hookworm, and silica dust, from the chat heaps, to say nothing of lead”. By
the early 1930s, the state in which it arose still had no workers’ compensation law for lead
poisoning.27 The continued exclusion of this El Paso smelter from regulatory regimes that
were standard in other American states suggests an intra-national and regional race to the
bottom in early twentieth-century America that anticipated the cross-national migrations of
industrial hazards later on.
The example of the El Paso smelter throws light on the industrial hygienists’ working
assumptionsinthisperiodaboutacertainlevelandstyleofurbanization. InChicago, where
Hamilton began her work, a city health department tackled issues of sanitation, housing
and sewage, not to mention smoke, justifying industrial hygiene’s conﬁnement to factory
interiors. But along the Mexico–US border, a place like “Smeltertown” (Figure 3) right
beside the El Paso smelter was subject to a steady barrage of lead and other fumes from its
smokestack with little or no intervention from any local health ofﬁcer. We know from later
studies that exposure in and around these homes could easily reach those in many parts of
the plant.28
26 ‘ASARCO Ray Complex’, http://www.asarco.
com/elpasoj.html; John W Drexler, A study on the
source of anomalous lead and arsenic concentrations
in soils from the El Paso community—El Paso, Texas,
accessed 6 June 2008 at http://www.epa.gov/
region6/6sf/pdfﬁles/ﬁnalreport.pdf; Isaac Frederick
Marcosson, Metal magic: the story of the American
Smelting & Reﬁning Company, New York, Farrar,
Straus, 1949.
27 Alice Hamilton, Exploring the dangerous
trades: the autobiography of Alice Hamilton, M.D.,
Boston, MA, Northeastern University Press, 1985, on
p. 146; idem, ‘Lead poisoning in the smelting and
reﬁning of lead’, Washington, Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1914, United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Industrial Accidents and
Hygiene Series, Bulletin no. 141; Workmen’s
compensation for occupational diseases, op. cit.,
note 25 above, p. 182.
28 Hamilton, Exploring the dangerous trades,
op. cit., note 27 above, for example, pp. 97–100;
P J Landrigan, S H Gehlbach, B F Rosenblum,
J M Shoults, et al., ‘Epidemic lead absorption near an
ore smelter: the role of particulate lead’, N. Engl. J.
Med., 1975, 292 (3): 123–9; B Raquel Ordóñez,
L Ruiz Romero andIRM ora, ‘Investigación
epidemiológica sobre niveles de plomo en la población
infantil y en el medio ambiente domiciliario de Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua, en relación con una fundición de
El Paso, Texas’, [Epidemiological study of lead levels
in the child population and the household environment
in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, as compared to
a foundry area in el Paso, Texas], Boletín de la Oﬁcina
Sanitaria Panamericana, 1976, 80 (4): 303–17; also
the impetus for the ﬁrst study came from a
collaboration between the Centers for Disease
Control and local health department ofﬁcials: see
reprint of the initial 1973 study in ‘Epidemiologic
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00049347.htm.
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Figure 3: The El Paso smelter and vicinity, circa 1889.
(Source: http://dmc.utep.edu/ oralh/GIFS/smelter.gif)
Finally, levels of lead pollution across the border in Mexico reveal assumptions about
industrialization that further blinkered American hygienists to lead’s actual course through
their own as well as this neighbouring nation. By the early 1930s, although American
capital had funded an industrial level of mining and smeltering in Mexico, many uses of
lead remained closer to a craft industry with which the professional hygienists, whether
in America or Europe, rarely bothered. In villages of southern Mexico, thousands of fam-
ilies earned a living through pottery production that relied on leaded glazes for colour.
Few uses of lead were more traditional than this, in which work exposures were barely
separated from those inside the home. Most of their small open kilns lay within home
lots. Interestingly, relatively recent studies of these family potting enterprises ﬁnd that
both children and adults get their biggest doses of lead from the food cooked in their
leaded pots.29
29 George M Foster, ‘The folk economy of rural
Mexico with special reference to marketing’, J.
Marketing, 1948, 13 (2): 153–62; Paul Taylor,
‘Making cántaros at San José Tateposco, Jalisco,
Mexico’, American Anthropologist, 1933, 35 (4):
745–51; E B Sayles, ‘Three Mexican crafts’,
American Anthropologist, 1955, n.s. 57 (5): 953–73;
G Molina-Ballesteros, M A Zuñiga-Charles,
J E García-de Alba, A Cárdenas-Ortega and
P Solis-Camara, ‘Lead exposure in two pottery
handicraft populations’, Archivos de Investigación
Médica, 1980, 11 (1): 147–54; R Hibbert, Zhipeng
Bai, Jaime Navia, Daniel M Kammen and Jungeng
Zhang, ‘High lead exposures resulting from pottery
production in a village in Michoacán State, Mexico’,
Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental
Epidemiology, 1999, 9 (4): 343–51, doi:10489159.
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We already have some sense of how turning a blind eye to these routes of exposure
to lead may have shaped the global perspective of America’s industrial hygienists in this
period, but less of how these same people may have managed the contrasting approaches
to lead during the 1930s by Mexican versus American politicians. American hygienists
saw Mexico’s industrial hazards as so thoroughly backward that the lead researcher Robert
Kehoe went to Mexico in 1933 to establish “primitive” exposure levels. In tiny mountain
villages around Ixtlahuaca, he sought a contrast with those he had measured for non-
occupational exposures in American cities. Among a population eating out of lead-glazed
pots, he surmised he was ﬁnding a pre-industrial “normal” lead level.30 Ironically, however,
the worker and peasant friendly regime of Lázaro Cárdenas had soon gone much further
than the American New Dealers by making those lead-related “conventions” recommended
by the ILO legally enforceable. In 1934, lead poisoning became compensable nationwide,
something that only America’s most industrial states had done. Some four years later the
Mexican national government passed a convention that never made it past any legislature
in the US, outlawing white lead paint in interiors.31
Around this same time, change was afoot in the global vision of the ILO (which the
US ﬁnally joined in 1934). Gradually, it began turning more attention to the problem of
industrial hygiene in the developing world. Carozzi initiated the ILO’s ﬁrst survey of what
wouldbecome,post-1945,anothercentralemphasis:theimportanceoftrainingprogrammes
in industrial medicine and hygiene. Compensation for a disease like lead poisoning, after
all, arguably meant little if there were no knowledgeable eyes to recognize or conﬁrm it;
not surprisingly, there were far more such programmes in the US than anywhere in Latin
America. Starting with a consultation visit to Egypt in 1938, Carozzi inaugurated after the
war a scheme that sought to address the dearth of expertise and other peculiar dilemmas
plaguing the workplaces of non-European and less developed nations.32 In taking up this
initiative, the ILO was joined by other post-Second World War international institutions,
notably the World Health Organization. Simultaneously, changes in the knowledge and
regulation of toxins such as lead, centred in places like the United States, bred new cross-
national contrasts in approach, as well as actual exposures, to industrial hazards.
The Uneven Development of Post-war Precautionism
Most historical work on the more aggressive approaches to lead regulation that emerged
after the Second World War has conﬁned itself to events within the scholars’ own nations.
30 Robert A Kehoe, Frederick Thamann and J
Cholak, ‘On the normal absorption and excretion of
lead. I. Lead absorption and excretion in primitive
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31 See entries for “Mexico” accessed 11 June 2008
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32 Luigi Carozzi, ‘Training in industrial medicine’,
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The recent burst of American scholarship shows how a more cautious approach to lead
unfolded that took a special interest in exposure not connected with the workplace; what
became known as the “environment”. The chief concern was now the exposure to lead
pollution of consumers and populations outside industrial plants, from peeling lead paint
to the burning of tetraethyl lead in petrol.33 Among the scientiﬁc changes ushering in this
new awareness from the 1950s into the 1970s, were the ever more subtle and long-term
effects of lead poisoning, especially among children, that caused behavioural disturbances,
slowed nerve conduction and lowered IQs. Scrutiny of lead levels in places where no one
lived, such as the Greenland ice shelf, also showed pre-industrial lead exposures turned
out to be several times lower than what Kehoe had found in his Mexicans.34 Changes in
lead science and regulation in the post-Second World War US owed much to the rise of a
federalandacademicresearchestablishmentdevotedtochronicdegenerativeailmentssuch
as cancer and heart disease, now widely recognized as the primary killers of Americans.
Publicfundingsourcesforresearchintoleadandotherindustrialandenvironmentalhazards
replaced an earlier reliance on corporate funding, exempliﬁed by Kehoe. After innovations
in epidemiology and toxicology helped to establish why a higher level of protection was
necessary, new federal laws and regulation took on a much wider range of consumer and
environmental hazards, from food additives to cigarettes to industrial pollution.35 While
we are now learning about the history of this precautionism within particular nations like
the United States, the cross-national dynamics that also drove or facilitated its advent
have received less attention. As with the preceding period, study of the global visions of
the time, like that of the ILO, may reveal much; so too, that of carefully selected local
sites.
Among the expedients turning many nations towards precautionary measures over the
post-war period was the widespread adoption of the Maximum Allowable Concentration
(MAC) levels by industrial hygienists. This strategy, ﬁrst used in a tentative way by French,
German and English investigators, came to full fruition in the industrial hygiene circles of
the United States (as well as the Soviet Union) during the 1930s and 1940s.36 It reﬂected
a growing conﬁdence in the ability of engineers to monitor and control the atmospheric
concentration of toxic dust such as lead, rather than waiting until workers actually became
sick. MAClevelsrepresentednotsomuchanabandonmentofthethresholdidea, embedded
in the clinical distinction between lead absorption and poisoning, as its formalization.
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Broaching the possibility that clinical poisoning could indeed be avoided, MACs opened
the door to still more preventive approaches. American professionals started compiling
entire “standard” lists of MAC levels for most workplace hazards, even before the Second
World War. We have much to learn about how the US and many other countries set about
adopting their own lists of MAC levels, as well as how the ILO and WHO sought to
harmonize these approaches into a single international standard.37 One driver of change
appears to have been the Cold War, which yielded a stark contrast in the way lead hazards
were studied on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. From the ﬁrst use of MACs in the 1940s,
Americans, following epidemiological and clinical studies by the United States Public
Health Service, set their tolerance levels for lead dust where clinical symptoms started to
occur. The Russians led their Eastern European allies in urging stricter standards, more like
thoseintheAmericans’regulationoffoodadditives, basedontoxicologicalexperimentson
animals. Despite American dismissals of post-war Russian research claims as propaganda
(and the lack of pollution control in the factories of Russia and Eastern Europe), these
turned out to be a precise prediction of where US lead research would go during the 1960s
and 1970s in its “effects ... on ... higher nervous activity”. 38
Although these international debates over lead science and regulation were no doubt
important, acomparisonbetweendevelopedandlessdevelopednationsatborder-straddling
industriallocales, liketheElPasosmelter, canuncoveragreatdealaboutthedifferingroots
and implications of the new precautionism. While the science moved beyond the worker
epidemiologyunderpinningtheearlyMAClevels,itdidnotfocussolelyonconsumerexpos-
ure to deleterious substances such as tobacco. Long-neglected or under-regulated factories
such as El Paso’s lead smelter served as pivotal sites for forging a new environmental epi-
demiology of resident populations. When Philip Landrigan, a paediatrician working for the
Centers for Disease Control, travelled to Smeltertown and vicinity in 1971, most of the
previous investigation of childhood lead poisoning had taken place in the interiors of cities
like Baltimore. Undertaking detailed environmental and clinical study of lead exposures
in the community surrounding the factory, Landrigan and his colleagues measured routes
and concentrations of lead and compared these with levels of lead in the blood of neigh-
bourhood children. They found strong, statistically signiﬁcant correlations between lead
exposure and blood levels of more than 40 micrograms per decilitre. Also administering
several neurological assessments, from ﬁnger-wrist tapping to IQ tests, they established
similar strong connections between this level of absorption and brain or nerve impairment.
37 International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry, Proceedings of the International
Symposium on maximum allowable concentrations of
toxic substances in industry, held in Prague,
Czechoslovakia, April 1959, London, Butterworths,
1961; Permanent Commission and International
Association on Occupational Health, and International
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, Symposium
international sur les limites tolérables pour les
substances toxiques dans l’industrie; comptes-rendus;
IIeme, Paris 1er Avril–6 Avril 1963, Paris, Institut
National de Securité, 1965; Joint ILO/WHO
Committee on Occupational Health, Permissible
levels of toxic substances in the working environment;
6th Session of the Joint ILO/WHO Committee on
Occupational Health, Geneva, 4–10 June 1968,
vol. 20, Occupational Safety and Health Series,
Geneva, International Labour Ofﬁce, 1970.
38 E I Lyublina, ‘Some methods used in
establishing the maximum allowable concentrations’,
in International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry,
Proceedings of the International Symposium on
Maximum allowable Concentrations of Toxic
Substances in Industry, held in Prague,
Czechoslovakia, April 1959, International Labour
Ofﬁce, Encyclopedia of occupational health and
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109, 110.
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This study was cited as providing some of the most conclusive evidence for the dropping
of lead levels of the late 1970s for workplace as well as outdoor air.39
A look at the local history, not just of this factory but of its surrounding environment,
illustrates how much more was at work in this new precautionism than simply professional
andscientiﬁcchange. Whatenabledthenewlaws, agenciesandfundingthatfuelledcaution
regarding lead and other hazards was not just new science but a groundswell of public
disquiet about industrial pollution. While labour unions and work stoppages played a role
in this explosion of concern in the US, it ﬂourished especially among those living in the
suburbs.40 Trends in the larger county where the El Paso smelter was located point to
widespread changes in urbanization that facilitated the avoidance of polluted areas: it had
become possible to live as well as work at a comfortable, more salubrious remove from
such industrial plants. Over the post-war period, the well-to-do inhabitants of El Paso
moved away from the factory area. Smeltertown itself came to be inhabited by mainly
lower income families of Hispanic origin, whose breadwinners dominated the smelter’s
workforce. Those moving to the suburbs were mostly wealthy and white, and unlikely to
do smelter work. The new public support for precautionism reﬂected an evolving urban
geography in the post-Second World War United States, marked by contrasts in ethnicity or
race, occupation, and wealth, which held out the possibility of total escape from the factory
(see Figure 4). Of course, in a place like El Paso, industrial pollution also denied it, by
ﬁnding its way into the whiter and wealthier suburbs. The Landrigan study was triggered
by just such exposures and their political repercussions.41 Today the model for industrial
pollution depicted on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) website captures this
“post-industrial” detachment from the factory in an idealized form (see Figure 5). Nobody
works or lives around these polluting factories; everyone lives and works across the river.
Here the provision of running water, ﬂush toilets, and water treatment, those sanitary
amenities pushed by earlier generations of health authorities, are taken for granted.
If these local urbanizing trends undergirded this new precautionism on the American
side of the border, trends in industrialization took the Mexican side in a quite different
direction. On a global scale, factories had begun migrating from developed nations like
the United States to developing countries like Mexico. The Mattel Corporation itself offers
a nice example. Begun in the Los Angeles area just after the Second World War, by the
early 1960s its southern California factories had undergone crippling strikes, and it was in
searchofnewfactorysettings. AmongtheﬁrstAmericancompaniestoestablishafactoryin
China, Mattel also turned to Mexico, whose government in 1965 set up tariff-free zones for
American companies just south of the US border. While Mattel and other toy makers chose
39 Landrigan, et al., op. cit., note 28 above;
P J Landrigan, E L Baker Jr, R G Feldman,
D H Cox, et al., ‘Increased lead absorption with
anemia and slowed nerve conduction in children
near a lead smelter’, J. Pediatrics, 1976, 89 (6):
904–10; National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, Occupational exposure to Inorganic
lead: revised criteria, 1978, vol. 78, DHEW
(NIOSH) publication [Cincinnati], US Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health
Service, Center for Disease Control, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
1978.
40 Hazel Erskine, ‘The polls: pollution and its
costs’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1972, 36 (1):
120–35; this is a central argument of Christopher C
Sellers, Unsettling ground: suburban nature and
environmentalism in twentieth-century America
(forthcoming from University of North Carolina
Press).
41 ‘Epidemiologic notes and reports’, op. cit.,
note 28 above.
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Figure 4: Higher income families by census tract, 1970, in the El Paso area. Wealthier residents,
who moved away from the smelter, also tended to be white rather than Hispanic, and to work in
professional and managerial positions.
(Data Source: http://www.nhgis.org/ map by Christopher Sellers.)
Tijuana, helping to install in it the biggest concentration of these maquiladora operations,
El Paso’s neighbour, Ciudad Juárez, was next in line by 1986, with nearly two hundred.
With this industrialization came an urbanization of quite different intensity and character
from that on the American side. Whereas between 1940 and 1980, El Paso grew ﬁvefold,
Ciudad Juárez, on the other side of the Rio Grande, expanded twenty-ﬁvefold. As the
EPA was created in the States and began to implement new federal environmental policies,
Cuidad Juárez’s population growth was rapidly outstripping that of El Paso, to attain nearly
half a million by 1980. Along with Tijuana just south of San Diego, where Mattel’s biggest
Mexican operation lay, these cities emerged as Mexico’s biggest industrial metropolises
outside Mexico City.42 The pattern of city growth contrasted even more starkly with that on
42 Louise Story, ‘After stumbling, Mattel cracks
down in China’, New York Times, 29 Aug. 2007,
accessed 7 June 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/08/29/business/worldbusiness/29mattel.html;
Tim Golden, ‘New ball game for Mexican toys’, New
York Times, 28 Aug. 1992, accessed 8 June 2008 at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/28/business/new-
ball-game-for-mexican-toys.html; Philip L Martin,
‘Foreign direct investment and migration: the case of
Mexican maquiladoras’, International Migration,
1992, 30 (3–4): 399–422; Paul Cooney, ‘The Mexican
crisis and the maquiladora boom: a paradox of
development or the logic of neoliberalism?’, Latin
American Perspectives, 2001, 28 (3): 55–83; Timothy
C Brown, ‘The fourth member of NAFTA: the
U.S.–Mexico Border’, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1997, 550:
105–21.
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Figure 5: Idealized depiction on the EPA website, 2004. The factory and other sources of pollution
lie across the river from all depicted residences.
(Source: http://www.epa.gov/indicate/roe/pdf/EPA_Draft_ROE.pdf)
the American side of the border, where precautionist science and principles had begun to
ﬂourish. Instead of moving further from Smeltertown, like the inhabitants of El Paso, new-
comers living in and around Ciudad Juárez crowded closer in. Just across from the factory
there emerged one of the colonias through which Cuidad Juárez and other Mexican towns
grew. An aerial photo from 1982 shows a stark contrast with the suburban neighbourhoods
and other settlements to the north, with small houses and bare yards, without lawns.
These contexts suggest reasons why precautionism was taken up more slowly in Mexico
than in the US, even as the exposures highlighted by the new environmental science were
indeed worse. By the 1970s, Mexican health experts had undertaken studies of their own
on environmental lead pollution, which duplicated Landrigan’s epidemiological approach.
Theirinvestigationwassmaller, withnoaccompanyingneurologicalstudies. Yettheyfound
more children at risk, including 52per cent of those within a mile of the smelter.43 That the
lead exposures were correspondingly more massive was, in part, a reﬂection of settlement
patterns that brought many more children into closer range of the plant. Mexican public
43 Smeltertown map accessed 9 May 2010 at
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/us_mexico_border/
txu_oclc_13545561_085. Jorge Morales, ‘History of
the National Federation of Occupational Health
(FeNaSTAC), Mexico’, in Antonio Grieco (ed.),
Origins of occupational health associations in the
world, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2003, esp. pp. 124–5;
Ordóñez, Ruiz Romero and Mora, op. cit., note 28
above.
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health ofﬁcials in towns like Juárez nevertheless faced more difﬁcult choices than their
American counterparts, for lead poisoning was not the only or even the most dangerous
healththreattothoselivinginplaceslikethecolonias. Asearlyas1977, theNewYorkTimes
wasreporting“hordesofsquatters”onJuárez’s“outskirts”,includingfamilieswithchildren.
In addition to dirty air, many of these houses were also without the sanitary safeguards like
runningwaterandﬂushtoiletsthatAmericanslargelytookforgranted. Sewageranthrough
open channels beside the streets. Monitoring of the water supply for bacteria only began in
the1990sontheMexicanside,andhepatitisandtuberculosisremainedconstantproblems.44
Although the new precautionist experts and regulations to the north furnished their
Mexican counterparts with ready-made methodologies and remedies, they faced additional
dilemmas that did not trouble American precautionists. For instance, following US as well
asotherinternationalexamples,Mexico’sfederalgovernmentinauguratedashiftawayfrom
leaded petrol in 1986. By 1998 lead had been eliminated from all petrol sold in the Mexico
City area, and mean aerial lead levels were plummeting. Yet the ways in which Mexico’s
national oil company Pemex reformulated petrol to take the lead out combined with this
mega-city’s predominantly older car ﬂeet to exacerbate other kinds of air pollution, notably
from ozone. In the realm of lead, as well, Mexico’s would-be precautionists still confronted
an array of endemic exposures that their American counterparts did not. Forty per cent of
familieslivinginthemetropolisstillusedlead-glazedceramics. Outsidethecity, notonlyis
pottery usage still more pervasive, rising tourism has enabled 1.5 million Mexican families
to continue to rely on family kilns for income.45
By 2007, when the story of Mattel’s toxic toys erupted, it is a safe, if ironic, bet that
the biggest impact of precautionist measures in Mexico was probably in Mattel’s plant in
Tijuana. Since the company shut down its last plant in the United States in 2002, its testing
facilities for what it sells there have been conﬁned to this south-of-the-border factory, to
whichtheChina-madegoodsstillinitsAmericanwarehouseswereshippedoncethestoryof
contamination broke. In Mexico City, meanwhile, consumer testing of toys by the national
government began only in 1994, nearly two decades after Mattel arrived in Tijuana.46 And
when it comes to toys, the Mexican consumer agency, unlike its American and European
counterparts, faces another level of dilemma: a huge market of native-made knock-offs or
44 ‘El Paso smelter still poses lead-poisoning peril
to children in Juárez’, New York Times, 28 Nov. 1977,
accessed at 8 June 2008 at http://
select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=
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Atmospheric Environment, 2000, 34 (3): 499–506;
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contraband. Nearly half the toys sold are illegal, hence not reachable even by increased
testing. Those toys that Mattel laboratories reject for their lead content may well wind up
being sold by unlicensed street-side vendors.47
We Americans and Europeans have come to precautionism only through decades, even
a century, of institutional development in our governments and professions, also more
quietly,inourformalprivateeconomy.InAmerica,anewself-described“environmental”or
“ecological” approach to industrial hazards coalesced hand in hand with the transformation
of American cities, homes and jobs, which enabled people to imagine factories, as well
as public health interventions like DDT, as doing more harm than good. No doubt there
were, and still are, corners of America and Europe untouched by precautionism, where
the more subtle risks of lead exposure are ignored or sloughed off. But more dramatic
differences in how lead is seen and interpreted—as well as actually distributed—are to be
found across a nation such as Mexico. Here, as in many parts of the developing world,
experts and advocates not only confront a greater magnitude and variety of lead hazards,
these come piled on top of others, including sanitary ones their US counterparts have long
sincefacedand“conquered”.InCiudadJuárez,industrialandchildhoodleadpoisoninghave
multiplied, and become recognized, hand in hand with water-borne infections. There, as in
Mexico City, lead exposure has proved difﬁcult to tame by those measures that worked in
the United States. Where, by best-guess projection, lead’s human contacts remain so much
more pervasive and persistent, the popular as well as medical cultures of lead cannot but be
different from those in the States.
Conclusions
Study of the genesis of these differences offers many engaging possibilities for medical,
health and other historians. We may, for instance, shed light on resistances to public health
interventions with which health activists have been confronted in a place such as Mexico.
Studies by public health educators tend to shout their bias towards the ﬁnal “stage” they
envision: where western experts themselves have wound up.48
A more robust attunement to cultural as well as environmental differences, and the
longerhistoricalcontraststhatliebehindthem, mayhelpusbetterunderstandthosepopular
categories through which lead and levels of exposure to it are understood. With such an
understanding may come further appreciation of what may stand in the way of inculcat-
ing a more modern lead ontology, those categories, values and contexts that stir active
resistance to the health educators’ messages. What seems clear is that the opposition and
scepticism faced by Mexican advocates runs deeper than the resistance of multinational
corporations, or the mistaken beliefs pinpointed by health educators. Our own “modern”
prescriptions for lead reach into what many Mexicans see as new economic opportunities,
but also into traditional spheres of knowledge and practice. Either way, they implicate ways
47 Diego Cevallas, ‘Latin America: careful with
the toys’, IPS News (August 30, 2007) accessed
26 February 2010 at http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=39080
48 See for instance table ‘Seven Stages of
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of life and livelihood that are not, or are no longer shared by most Americans and western
Europeans.
Along this and other fronts, the cross-national study of industrial hazards has much to
offer, inpartbecauseofhowmanageableithasbecome. Innovationsnotjustfromhistoryof
science and of medicine but from labour and business, environmental and urban history, as
well as several decades of environmental science, have facilitated very different encounters
with lead and other toxins on the same analytical and historical page. If we are willing
to range across the available intellectual registers, to strive after an environmental as well
as a socio-cultural symmetry in our analysis, we can understand simultaneous trajectories
of nations as different as the US and Mexico in comparable terms. We thereby also begin
to fathom precisely how asymmetrical their trajectories have been. Differing histories of
the engineering as well as the control of lead’s ﬂows and exposures underpin contrasting
ontologiesofleadanditseffectsinthesetwonations.Centraltotheachievementoffootloose
ﬁrms like Mattel has been their ability to extract proﬁt from such cross-national differences
in the ontology of toxins like lead, while keeping their own hands relatively clean. Until
very recently, perhaps.
Through the last few decades, the ﬂight of factories and industrial production from the
developed to the developing nations has reshaped our world, but also subtly warped how
medical and other historians have seen it. Simply by tackling this important subject, we
join many other scholars in helping to puncture the conceit that ours is a “post-industrial
society”. What is such a notion, if not an excuse for developed-world scholars to avert our
eyes from our continuing dependencies on production elsewhere? Within the scholarship
that challenges such ideas, historians of health and medicine, as well as the environment,
have an especially critical role to play. We come intellectually armed to bring out what
many other scholars have tended to neglect: that this historical shift in the geography of
industry has had human bodily as well as ecological consequences. Among the rewards in
taking on historical contrasts as marked as those between the United States and Mexico, is
the deeper and broader understanding of what has enabled health advances in a nation such
as the United States itself. Through such comparisons, the underlying conditions for public
health victories like that of America’s precautionists over lead—from the human capital of
expertise, the eradication of pre-existing “traditional” materials and practices, the peculiar
style of post-Second World War urbanization—stand out precisely because of their relative
absence in a places like Mexico, where precautionists have had a considerably harder time.
In order to plumb the gravity and implications of such a topic we cannot, however, afford
tobescepticalaboutthevarioussciencesofleadthathaveemergedacrosstimeandplace;on
what the dangers of lead are, we must take ontological sides. After all, what appeals in this,
as in so many topics that today’s historians choose to take up, is its moral dimensions, what
historical investigation may say to our own place and time. Seeking out the transnational
trail of lead in history demonstrates how, in the past as well as the present, that pathway
does not stop at our own nation’s borders. Such a history reinforces the message that the
currents of toxins in a place like Mexico or China may continue to track back to us in the
developed world who now usually imagine ourselves to be living “lead-free”. When I start
up my car or turn on a computer, I am not sure I will ever habitually think of a belching
lead smelter or a coughing mine worker in China. But my hope is that histories that stir
awarenessoflead’spresentabsenceinourownlivesmayhelptoinoculateusagainstatleast
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some of the indifference to which our globalizing age is prone. In an important sense, we
re-connect with that smelter and those workers and their children each and every day. We
do this not so much through our perception of lead, nor through any bodily hazard it poses
to us, rather by reliance on the lead which they have passed our way. This common material
thread also binds us to the hazards and the victims it has wrought elsewhere. Building this
commonality into our histories invites a search for ways of taking responsibility for the
costs it imposes, however distant and remote.
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